法庭上拉布之四: Dead Duck Appeal

我在法庭上拉布之三：黃毓民及陳偉業定罪之後 一文講過，若果兩位被告的上訴在高等法院被駁回，再上一層的機會近乎零，除非他們能夠提出以前法庭未釐清的具有重大而廣泛重要性的法律論點，否則終審法院不會批出上訴許可。在此，再進一步討論這看法。

終審法院在2012年聽了15宗刑事案上訴許可申請，嚴格講其中3宗應當作1宗來看，只批准其中4宗可上訢至終審法院。4宗裏面，3宗涉及法律論點，1宗涉及顯示曾有實質及嚴重的不公平情況。即是13宗只有4宗成功，而4宗最後的上訴成功率在現階段還未可料。可見，上訴到底的決心，往往只是一廂情願的看法。案情事實的上訴難獲批的原因，看看下面這3段判辭便一目了然。


5. Since the earliest days of its establishment,[2] this Court has emphasised that the “substantial and grave injustice” ground for granting leave is not intended to cast the Court in the role of a second Court of Appeal. It was made clear in So Yiu Fung v HKSAR, [3] that:

“This Court’s primary role in the administration of criminal justice is to resolve real controversy on points of law of great and general importance. For this Court does not function as a court of criminal appeal in the ordinary way. However the ‘substantial and grave injustice’ limb of s.32(2) exists as a residual safeguard to cater for those rare and exceptional cases in which there is a real danger of something so seriously wrong that justice demands an enquiry by way of a final criminal appeal despite the absence of any real controversy on any point of law of great and general importance.”[4] ...

“Reviewing convictions to see if they are safe and satisfactory is entrusted to the intermediate appellate court. If the matter proceeds further to this Court, our task does not involve repeating that exercise. We perform a different one. In order for an appeal brought under the ‘substantial and grave injustice’ limb of s.32(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance to succeed, it must be shown that there has been to the appellant’s disadvantage a departure from accepted norms which departure is so serious as to constitute a substantial and grave injustice.”[5]

6. We wish to stress that in all future applications on the substantial and grave injustice ground, the application for leave to appeal must identify the specific way in which it is submitted that the court below has departed from established legal norms; and why such departure is so seriously wrong that justice demands a hearing before the Court of Final Appeal notwithstanding the absence of any real controversy on any point of law of great and general importance. It will simply not be sufficient merely to set out the same arguments that were canvassed in the court below.

7. If the application for leave to appeal does not disclose such grounds or does not provide a reasonably arguable basis for such submissions, it may expect to be dismissed summarily under Rule 7 of the Court’s rules.

(Kosar Mahmood and HKSAR FAMC31/2012)

終審法院再次强調聽審上訴以法律論點為主，如果兩名被告純粹提出杜浩成(原審裁判官)沒理由信納警察口供之類的講法，休想獲得上訴許可。黄毓民更休想講6天半陳辭，大概講幾句就要兜著走。終審法院不是擺龍門陣的地方。

在周諾恆/黃軒瑋案(搶咪案)，陳兆愷法官批出控辯雙就法律觀點上訴許可時，講了下面這句話：

4. We wish to emphasise that the grant of leave in this case must not be taken to suggest that the Court will condone non-peaceful protest.

(HKSAR and Chow Nok Hang/Wong Hin Wai FAMC39/2012)

無端端講這句「不要以為法庭會寬免非和平性質的示威」，在只有短短4段的上訴許可判辭來講，有點格格不入。如果兩位被告(黃、陳)講示威權利，LEUNG KWOK HUNG and Others and HKSAR FACC1/2005一案已經探討了；講案情事實，杜浩成又裁定示威並非和平理性，也看不到裁決顯示實質及嚴重的不公平之處，請問還有甚麼理據上訴？唯一可能是，判辭寫得差。這個嘛，日後才有分曉。