今天看了司法機構上載的這件案：香港特別行政區 訴 温廣賢，由高院法官黃崇厚聽審，我看了之後對於上訴得直甚不同意，旨在討論，故此寫這一篇。
控方案情
6. 第一控罪關乎控方指稱上訴人在一間壽司店內偷了一名女士的手提電話，日子是2014年7月28日。
7. 第二控罪則關乎控方指稱上訴人在同一壽司店內備有一支彈弓式鈎，以供在與盜竊有關的事項上使用，日子是2014 年8月14日。
8. 控方傳召了3名證人：第一證人是失去手提電話的物主、第二證人是上述壽司店的職員、第三證人是負責調查的警員。
9. 控方第一證人不知道她的電話手機如何失去。她在購買了壽司後，便發現手機不見了，隨即返回壽司店和報警。
10. 店中的閉路電視錄影[3] 了以下的情況[4]:
2014年7月28日22時至23時，… …一名男子在該店內徘徊,曾經離開，又再返回。他在細小的舖內，來來回回兩邊的壽司櫃。他常常在其他顧客的後面穿插，但他並沒有購買壽司。
約22時17分43秒，第一證人來到該店，該男子凝望着她。他本來沒有壽司在手上,但當第一證人走去排隊付錢時,該男子即從櫃內取了壽司,放在左手拿著的卡紙上，狀似跟著第一證人排隊付錢。該男子緊貼第一證人身後。此時，他的右手狀似伸向第一證人左手手臂上正打開了的環保袋(“證物P10”)的方向。可是，從鏡頭的角度,第一證人的身體剛剛遮蔽了該男子那一刻右手的動作。接著，該男子用右手取起他左手的壽司,把壽司放回櫃內,並倒後行，沒有再排隊付錢,急步離開該店。
該男子當時穿上及戴上:-
1. 灰色T恤 (T恤上有類似燈胆的圖案);
2. 灰色褲 (長度至膝頭蓋);
3. 左膊頭孭著一個藍色環保袋(袋上有一Alpha字眼的紅色圖案);
4. 一對黑色球鞋 (鞋上有Mizuno美津龍品牌的標誌);
5. 深色邊的眼鏡。
11. 控方第二證人在8月14日見到一名男子，那人背著藍色環保袋、穿上黑色球鞋，戴上眼鏡，他便報警。
12. 控方第三證人於相關時間在該店監視，並觀察了上訴人一段時間，接報後在該店門外以盜竊罪拘捕了上訴人。在警誡下，上訴人說：「無喎。」[5]
13. 當上訴人被帶往警署之後，在點算他的個人物品時，發現一枝彈弓鈎。[6] 控方第三證人以第二項罪的罪名拘捕上訴人。警誡下，上訴人說：「阿Sir,我平時裝修用嘅。」 [7] 後來，上訴人又說：「果支彈弓鈎我用黎鈎裝修啲油漆天拿水布。」
14. 第三證人拘捕上訴人時，上訴人正携帶印有Alpha字樣的藍色環保袋(“證物P3”)，穿著一雙黑白色Mizuno牌子球鞋 (“證物P4”)。警方也在上訴人的住所檢取了一條灰色短褲 (“證物P8”)及一件灰色T恤 (“證物P9”)。
我只講偷電話那項控罪，另一項上訴駁回我不討論。這偷電話案明顯靠推論，沒有人見到是上訴人幹的，也不是人贓並獲。沒有爭議的是壽司店內閉路電視拍攝到偷電話男子的舉動，裁判官推論該男子是上訴人。她所持的理由是：
「從P2所見,該男子在該店徘徊，他的態度及行為，明顯無心在店內購買壽司。
雖然，因角度問題,本席未完全看到該男子伸手入第一證人的環保袋內。但是,本席看到，該男子的右手正正朝著第一證人的環保袋方向伸去。接著，他立刻返回壽司櫃放下壽司，不再排隊付錢，及倒後行急步離場。隨即，第一證人便找不到她的電話。
從以上所見所聞,本席可以作出一個無可抗拒的推論,就是該男子伸手偷去控方第一證人環保袋內的電話。」[12]
(3) 上訴人便是那名男子，理由如下：
「從閉路電視影像所見(P2),該男子穿著及攜帶的:-
1. T恤，與警方在上訴人家中檢獲的T恤P9是一樣，即有一燈胆的圖案;
2. 灰色褲(有側袋的)，與警方在上訴人家中檢獲的短褲P8是近似的;
3. 環保袋，與8月14日即場檢獲的環保袋P3是一樣,也是有Alpha字眼; 及
4. 一對黑色球鞋，與8月14日他所穿的球鞋P4，牌子也是一樣的。
至於眼鏡，第3證人看見上訴人在8月14日是有戴眼鏡的(但他在庭上卻沒有戴眼鏡)。第3證人稱，上訴人的眼鏡也與閉路電視拍到該男子戴的眼鏡近似。
辯方提出,T恤、褲、環保袋，及球鞋，也是大量製造出來,相同並不出為奇。本席明白，的確如此。但是，本席不相信會如此巧合：相同或近似的T恤、灰褲、環保袋及球鞋, 也同時在上訴人身上及家裏找到,而當日2014年8月14日,上訴人又是戴上近似的眼鏡。本席不相信，5個巧合，會同時發生在同一人身上。因此,本席可以作出一個無可抗拒的推論,上訴人就是閉路電視上拍到的該男子。
至於,上訴人就盜竊罪，在警誡下答稱 “無喎”。本席認為，他只為自己開脫,不予比重。」
上訴法庭批准上訴得直的理據是：
35. 以本案而言，裁判官的責任，是評估考慮整體證據的累積效應，以決定是否可以肯定上訴人一定是偷竊控方第一證人的電話手機的人。
36. 裁判官認為證據足以支持定罪的推論。代表答辯方的高級檢控官陳冰華認同裁判官的結論。
37. 本席認為，如此巧合，上訴人是犯案者的可能性是很高的，但是，經仔細思量後，始終沒有裁判官般肯定。
這種不肯定的依據是甚麽？被告沒有作供，即是在裁判官席前只有控方證據給她考盧，而裁判官的推論錯在那裏？
控方案情
6. 第一控罪關乎控方指稱上訴人在一間壽司店內偷了一名女士的手提電話，日子是2014年7月28日。
7. 第二控罪則關乎控方指稱上訴人在同一壽司店內備有一支彈弓式鈎，以供在與盜竊有關的事項上使用，日子是2014 年8月14日。
8. 控方傳召了3名證人：第一證人是失去手提電話的物主、第二證人是上述壽司店的職員、第三證人是負責調查的警員。
9. 控方第一證人不知道她的電話手機如何失去。她在購買了壽司後，便發現手機不見了，隨即返回壽司店和報警。
10. 店中的閉路電視錄影[3] 了以下的情況[4]:
2014年7月28日22時至23時，… …一名男子在該店內徘徊,曾經離開，又再返回。他在細小的舖內，來來回回兩邊的壽司櫃。他常常在其他顧客的後面穿插，但他並沒有購買壽司。
約22時17分43秒，第一證人來到該店，該男子凝望着她。他本來沒有壽司在手上,但當第一證人走去排隊付錢時,該男子即從櫃內取了壽司,放在左手拿著的卡紙上，狀似跟著第一證人排隊付錢。該男子緊貼第一證人身後。此時，他的右手狀似伸向第一證人左手手臂上正打開了的環保袋(“證物P10”)的方向。可是，從鏡頭的角度,第一證人的身體剛剛遮蔽了該男子那一刻右手的動作。接著，該男子用右手取起他左手的壽司,把壽司放回櫃內,並倒後行，沒有再排隊付錢,急步離開該店。
該男子當時穿上及戴上:-
1. 灰色T恤 (T恤上有類似燈胆的圖案);
2. 灰色褲 (長度至膝頭蓋);
3. 左膊頭孭著一個藍色環保袋(袋上有一Alpha字眼的紅色圖案);
4. 一對黑色球鞋 (鞋上有Mizuno美津龍品牌的標誌);
5. 深色邊的眼鏡。
11. 控方第二證人在8月14日見到一名男子，那人背著藍色環保袋、穿上黑色球鞋，戴上眼鏡，他便報警。
12. 控方第三證人於相關時間在該店監視，並觀察了上訴人一段時間，接報後在該店門外以盜竊罪拘捕了上訴人。在警誡下，上訴人說：「無喎。」[5]
13. 當上訴人被帶往警署之後，在點算他的個人物品時，發現一枝彈弓鈎。[6] 控方第三證人以第二項罪的罪名拘捕上訴人。警誡下，上訴人說：「阿Sir,我平時裝修用嘅。」 [7] 後來，上訴人又說：「果支彈弓鈎我用黎鈎裝修啲油漆天拿水布。」
14. 第三證人拘捕上訴人時，上訴人正携帶印有Alpha字樣的藍色環保袋(“證物P3”)，穿著一雙黑白色Mizuno牌子球鞋 (“證物P4”)。警方也在上訴人的住所檢取了一條灰色短褲 (“證物P8”)及一件灰色T恤 (“證物P9”)。
我只講偷電話那項控罪，另一項上訴駁回我不討論。這偷電話案明顯靠推論，沒有人見到是上訴人幹的，也不是人贓並獲。沒有爭議的是壽司店內閉路電視拍攝到偷電話男子的舉動，裁判官推論該男子是上訴人。她所持的理由是：
「從P2所見,該男子在該店徘徊，他的態度及行為，明顯無心在店內購買壽司。
雖然，因角度問題,本席未完全看到該男子伸手入第一證人的環保袋內。但是,本席看到，該男子的右手正正朝著第一證人的環保袋方向伸去。接著，他立刻返回壽司櫃放下壽司，不再排隊付錢，及倒後行急步離場。隨即，第一證人便找不到她的電話。
從以上所見所聞,本席可以作出一個無可抗拒的推論,就是該男子伸手偷去控方第一證人環保袋內的電話。」[12]
(3) 上訴人便是那名男子，理由如下：
「從閉路電視影像所見(P2),該男子穿著及攜帶的:-
1. T恤，與警方在上訴人家中檢獲的T恤P9是一樣，即有一燈胆的圖案;
2. 灰色褲(有側袋的)，與警方在上訴人家中檢獲的短褲P8是近似的;
3. 環保袋，與8月14日即場檢獲的環保袋P3是一樣,也是有Alpha字眼; 及
4. 一對黑色球鞋，與8月14日他所穿的球鞋P4，牌子也是一樣的。
至於眼鏡，第3證人看見上訴人在8月14日是有戴眼鏡的(但他在庭上卻沒有戴眼鏡)。第3證人稱，上訴人的眼鏡也與閉路電視拍到該男子戴的眼鏡近似。
辯方提出,T恤、褲、環保袋，及球鞋，也是大量製造出來,相同並不出為奇。本席明白，的確如此。但是，本席不相信會如此巧合：相同或近似的T恤、灰褲、環保袋及球鞋, 也同時在上訴人身上及家裏找到,而當日2014年8月14日,上訴人又是戴上近似的眼鏡。本席不相信，5個巧合，會同時發生在同一人身上。因此,本席可以作出一個無可抗拒的推論,上訴人就是閉路電視上拍到的該男子。
至於,上訴人就盜竊罪，在警誡下答稱 “無喎”。本席認為，他只為自己開脫,不予比重。」
上訴法庭批准上訴得直的理據是：
36. 裁判官認為證據足以支持定罪的推論。代表答辯方的高級檢控官陳冰華認同裁判官的結論。
37. 本席認為，如此巧合，上訴人是犯案者的可能性是很高的，但是，經仔細思量後，始終沒有裁判官般肯定。
這種不肯定的依據是甚麽？被告沒有作供，即是在裁判官席前只有控方證據給她考盧，而裁判官的推論錯在那裏？
正如高院法官McWalters(當時官階)在HKSAR v Ip Chin Kei案指出，聽審上訴的處理態度：
“(5) The appellate court will only depart from a magistrate’s finding of fact or determination of a witness’ credibility if satisfied that it is plainly wrong.
Lord Reed in Henderson (Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd and Anor [2014] SCLR 692)considered the meaning of the test of “plainly wrong” and said:
上大人可以跟九品芝蔴官看法不一樣，但小吏的推論合理，上大人就不應推翻，要推翻也要講出所以然，而並非憑感覺。這就是我覺得聽審上訴法官有時欠缺的地方。這件案上訴得直，不就是Henderson所講 "It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. "
從整篇判辭仔細看，上訴人分別兩日在同一壽司店出現和徘徊，就是在找尋扒竊對象。就算第一項控罪上訴得直，第二項控罪的刑期上訴也可以增重刑罰。上訴人有9次和盜竊有關的案底，典型recidivism，為何不就著他對判刑上訴而調高刑期？
Lord Reed in Henderson (Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd and Anor [2014] SCLR 692)considered the meaning of the test of “plainly wrong” and said:
“62. … There is a risk that it may be misunderstood. The adverb ‘plainly’ does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appellate court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
從整篇判辭仔細看，上訴人分別兩日在同一壽司店出現和徘徊，就是在找尋扒竊對象。就算第一項控罪上訴得直，第二項控罪的刑期上訴也可以增重刑罰。上訴人有9次和盜竊有關的案底，典型recidivism，為何不就著他對判刑上訴而調高刑期？
(Bill, I'm afraid this time it's again me. I really like manageable points of law.)
回覆刪除I would reach the same decision as Wong J, albeit because of different reasoning.
The magistrate was said to have made the only irresistible inference and convicted the defendant (para 28). But was it the ONLY irresistible inference? I say that the answer is NO.
First, the magistrate held that the similarity between thief's clothing and the defendant's clothing was NOT coincidental (para 18(3)). However, as the judge held, the clothing was not particularly unique, but was only ordinary clothing (paras 29-34). Obviously, it was open to find the similarity coincidental or not.
Second, even if this was insufficient to drive the judge's decision home (as Bill contended), the magistrate did not describe how the thief's face in the CCTV resembled the defendant's face (para 26). This was a material consideration which should have been considered, because this fortifies the first point (para 25). (If the magistrate had done so, I would have uphold the magistrate's decision. But the magistrate did not, and so the conviction was unsatisfactory.)
Therefore, if Bill wishes to maintain the point on the "degree of certainty" against my reasoning (though I agree that Wong J's reasoning was based on his "confidence" (para 37-38)), I argue that the magistrate's decision was "plainly wrong" in relying on the similarity, attaching too much weight on such circumstantial evidence, and failing to consider the CCTV evidence.
finding fact by starting from the losing post and running forward,
PHLI
Nice try. I do not wish to embroil in argument without sufficient facts. At least we do not have the benefit of watching the CCTV. The resolution and quality is unknown. If the quality is not desirable, it may not be wise to venture a fruitful analysis on that. After all, my point here is the general attitude of the appellate court instead of retrying the case online.
回覆刪除I personally felt that the better arguement point would be if there is sufficient evidence to show the man in the discribed outfit actually stole the phone. Did the owner of the phone (PW1) show her phone in the CCTV before the man queue behind her? If not, how can the judge reach "irresistible inference" that the phone was stolen in the sushi shop? Afterall, I think the key evidence (the stolen phone) is missing in this trial.
回覆刪除P
Para 18 of the judgment paraphrased what the trial magistrate said about the proximity of the time of last sighting of the phone and that it was stolen:
刪除18. 就第一控罪，她裁定：
(1) 控方第一證人是在店內被盜去電話的，理由如下：
「第一證人步入該店前仍在用電話。入該店前一刻，她才掛線及把電話放入她的環保袋。證物P2[10] 內顯示,第一證人在22時17分20秒，行入該店內；她在22 時19分11秒離開。在這短短的時間內, 她便發現她的電話不翼而飛，即她的電話，大可能是她在店內時，被他人盜竊。」[11]
Dear Bill,
回覆刪除I am a bit of confused. It seems to me that the appellate judge has indeed accepted the facts found by the magistrate: the clothes, shoes etc found in the defendant's home matched with the clothes worn by the theft in CCTV footage. However, whether this implies that the defendant is the theft in CCTV is, I think, an inference. The magistrate thought that the chance that it is coincident is so slim that the inference is irresistible; the judge agreed that the chance is slim, but it falls short of saying that it is irresistible.
I have read the judgement of HKSAR v Ip Chin Kei. In para 65, McWalters J said:
"(5) The appellate court will only depart from a magistrate’s finding of fact or determination of a witness’ credibility if satisfied that it is plainly wrong."
However, this refers to finding of facts and witness' credibility only; I am not sure whether it also applies to inference.
In the same paragraph, McWalter J said,
"(8) Absent the appellate court identifying any error by the magistrate and absent any of the grounds of appeal succeeding, the appellate court must still perform its statutory duty of conducting a rehearing. This requires the appellate court to be satisfied that on the evidence adduced by the prosecution the guilt of the appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, failing which the appeal must be allowed."
Also in paragraph 60:
"... Likewise even if no error has been identified and no ground of appeal made out that is not the end of the matter. The duty is on the appellate court to conduct a rehearing and that is what it must do for its ultimate duty is to determine whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant ..."
So, is it just what the judge has done in this case: even though he has found no error in the magistrate's finding of facts, he re-heard the case and decided that the conclusion of the magistrate, i.e. the defendant is the thief in CCTV, is not an irresistible inference, and thus the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and allowed the appeal?
PLK
I have no dispute the appellate court can re-hear the case. I believe inference is also a finding of facts. What Wong J hesitated is whether the appearance of the thief captured on CCTV was the deft. I cannot go into detail of the CCTV aspect because I have no idea how good the resolution is. Even if I can see the CCTV recording, I won't say here whether Wong J erred. I suppose if there is clear resemblance between the image captured and the deft, the magistrate should have included. I can only infer the recording is not of good resolution or at least there is no striking dissimilarity between the two. Given the CCTV does not help or harm in this regard, Wong J's comment about the absence of such in the statement of findings is not reasonable. I suppose whether the inference is irresistable or otherwise is factual. Can Wong J say the magistrate's inference is unreasonable?
刪除I do not mean to pick bones from an egg. Rehearing by the appellate court is not a statutory duty. It is a common law duty.