不公義的工具

上訴庭法官薛偉成(Kevin Zervos)未加入司法機構前是刑事檢控專員, 我以前評論過他是歷任刑事檢控專員中最具拚搏精神的一位, 他自己披甲上陣的次數之多是近十多年歷任刑事檢控專員的總和, 我這樣講並無實際數據, 只憑印象得來的感覺。談起薛偉成, 是因為看了上週五他頒發一份律政司不想他公開的判詞: 

Secretary for Justice and Law Hiu-fung (羅曉峰) and others CACC 13/2023 and CACC 14/2023

本案各大傳媒昨天都有報導, 明報有這一篇: 脫罪者纏訟3年 上訴庭拒批拘捕令 律政司另申判辭保密同遭拒 官：公告保公正。簡而言之:

【明報專訊】上月兩宗關於2019年11月18日理工大學外圍案件裁決，共有9名被告分別被判非法集結或暴動罪不成立。律政司不滿裁決，早前以案件呈述形式向9人提出上訴，同時要求上訴庭發出拘捕手令，將他們再次帶返法庭以加諸有條件的保釋。上訴庭法官薛偉成昨日頒布判辭，稱9名答辯人過往3年間受檢控纏擾，受嚴厲的保釋條件以限制人生自由，認為毋須再向各人施加保釋，遂拒絕律政司就發出拘捕令的申請，同時拒絕律政司將判辭保密的申請。

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案件呈述形式的上訴 (appeal by way of case stated)是針對原審法官法律上犯錯的上訴(on matters of law only), 所謂法律上犯錯並不局限於法律上見解的錯誤, 也包括案情事實上有悖於常理(perverse)的裁決。終審法院在Li Man Wai一案概括了這方面的法律概念, 薛官在另一案闡述了這概念 :

31. The Court of Final Appeal in Li Man Wai v SJ (2003) 6 HKCFAR 466 emphasised that an appeal by way of case stated is not an appeal by way of rehearing but a review by the appellate court on the limited ground that there is an error of law or an excess of jurisdiction. The Court went on to explain that where a magistrate has come to a conclusion or finding of fact which no reasonable magistrate, applying his mind to the proper considerations and giving himself the proper directions, could have come to, this would be regarded as an error of law which is often described as being perverse. The appellate court would be entitled to intervene where it is satisfied that the magistrate, in reaching his conclusion or finding, has misdirected himself on the facts or misunderstood them, or has taken into account irrelevant considerations or has overlooked relevant considerations.

在Li Man Wai案, 終審法院認為"...But it is not perverse, even if it may be mistaken, to prefer the evidence of A to that of B where they are in conflict. "即是說若法官在聽完被告的講法後, 採納了被告的講法而不採納控方的講法, 就算出於誤解, 也不屬有悖於常理。薛官現階段處理律政司申請拘捕令一事, 並未正式審理本案呈述形式的上訴, 但從初步分析來看, 涉及大部份被判無罪的被告, 原審法官判他們無罪, 都屬於 "prefer the evidence of A to that of B" 的案情事實的裁決, 並非有悖於常理的判決, 所以本案的上訴結果, 大部份都會敗訴。在2019年以前, 律政司對法庭 "prefer the evidence of A to that of B"的案情事實判決提出上訴是罕見的。這方面的法律概念一直都沒有新發展, 只是律政司的態度改變了, 涉及政治因素的案件都追殺到底。

薛官在本判詞也引述他自己在另一案(SFC v Chan Shui Sheung Ivy)的判詞的普通法概念:

“64. As I have already observed, the power under section 105 should be used appropriately by prosecuting authorities and only in the most clear and obvious cases where in the interest of justice a judge’s opinion is required in relation to a magistrate’s decision on the ground that it is erroneous in point of law, or that it is in excess of jurisdiction. Where a defendant has been acquitted of a criminal charge he can and should expect that the matter has been finally determined unless there has been some clear and obvious error of law that warrants further adjudication. The principle of finality plays an important role in fostering trust and confidence in our criminal justice system. Excessive and inappropriate use of this power may become an instrument of injustice."

薛偉成引用這段判詞指出finality的重要, 是借此批評律政司不當行使權力, 成為不公義的工具嗎?  Rule of law同rule by law的分別就在這裏。彰顯法治的精神和把法律視為工具, 不是三言兩語說得清的。我沒有足夠資格批評別人, 但我有足夠堅持, 不左右逢源, 有些人我羞與為伍, 減少不必要的交往。時代改變了, 必定有人隨波逐流, 也必定有人被後浪淹沒的, 只要死而無怨, 只要是個人選擇, 也無可無不可。