本案對楊專員的威信打擊不少, 不是勝敗的關係。我以前講過, 歷屆的DPP披甲上陣最多的是薛偉成(Zervos), 他十分勇猛和辛辣, 轉任高院後現已是上訴庭法官。楊專員是事務律師出身, 一直在刑事檢控科辦事, 上庭經驗也豐富, 能力怎樣我沒資格評論, 我只是見過她初入職的模樣, 差不多時期入職的李運騰(Alex Lee)可能因為擁有短暫紀律部隊背景, 所以我覺得他思路清晰, 但這都是以前的印象, 後來就只能從判詞判斷個人能力。
這次黎智英上訴的判詞看到甚麼, 看倌當然要自己看。但我引用幾段來拋磚引玉, 以滿足在此出沒咪咪叫的小貓狺狺吠的小狗的食慾。判詞第118至123段足以使專員兩晚睡不着。第一點是專員沒有依賴《刑事訴訟程序條例》第101E條，即使該條文為最顯而易見的檢控途徑, 而依賴普通法的原則, 但本末倒置。第二點是在上訴時, 楊專員不能提出新理據爭辯。
118. In case we were wrong on sub-issue 1, we proceed to deal with the second sub-issue on attribution.
119. On the available evidence, the obvious route to attribute Apple Daily Printing’s breach of duty of disclosure to the applicants is section 101E of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221), which provides:
“Where a person by whom an offence under any Ordinance has been committed is a company and it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of a director or other officer concerned in the management of the company, or any person purporting to act as such director or officer, the director or other officer shall be guilty of the like offence.”
However, the prosecution had not invoked it at trial. When we at the hearing query why the prosecution did not do so, Ms Yang does not offer any explanation. Instead, she expressly states that she will not rely on the section either. In light of her position, any further consideration as to whether and how the section might have augmented the prosecution case is academic.
120. Ms Yang seeks to rely on the established principle that corporate bodies are deemed to act and acquire knowledge through those individuals who can be identified as its directing minds: Smith, Hogan & Ormerod’s Criminal Law, 17th Edition, §§8.1.2, 23.2; R v A Ltd & Others [2017] 1 Cr App R 1, at §§26-27; R v Alstom Network UK Ltd [2019] 2 Cr App R 34, at §30. Under this principle, the company is fixed with criminal liability through the acts or omissions of its directing mind. As the learned editors of Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (2025) summarized at §A6.23:
“Because a company is a separate person from its officers, the officers will not necessarily be guilty of a crime just because the company is. Conversely, since a company may be fixed with criminal liability through the acts or omissions of its ‘directing mind’, the way for criminal liability to be proved may, depending on the relevant rule of attribution, be by identifying the criminal acts of one of its officers; in those circumstances both the individual officer and the company may be guilty. In appropriate circumstances, both the company and its officers may be charged with a criminal offence and/or with aiding and abetting an employee to commit a crime …”
121. This rule is the criminal law’s solution to the lack of a corporate body to perform the actus reus and a corporate mind capable of forming mens rea by treating the minds and bodies of the officers concerned as supplying its mental and physical faculties: Smith, Hogan & Ormerod’s Criminal Law, §8.1.2.5. It only attributes criminal liability to a company through the act of its officer who is the directing mind. It does not have the opposite effect of attributing the company’s criminal liability to its officers. Ms Yang’s reliance on this rule is entirely misplaced. If her submission were accepted, it would turn the rule on its head.
G3. Sub-issue 3: Did the applicants have an independent personal duty?
122. Ms Yang makes no submission that the applicants owed the Corporation an independent personal duty to disclose Apple Daily Printing’s breach of the user restrictions or the non-alienation clauses. That is a recognition on her part that no such duty arose either as a matter of law or on the facts.
123. In her oral submissions, Ms Yang raises two fresh points for the first time on appeal:
(1) Both Apple Daily Printing and the applicants might be held liable under the Charges as participants to a joint enterprise. However, that is not what the Charges alleged. Further, Apple Daily Printing has not been named as a co-defendant, contrary to the rudimentary requirement that the prosecution must expressly name a co-defendant in a joint charge if his identity is known.
(2) The 1st applicant had used Apple Daily Printing as a vehicle to perpetrate the fraud against the Corporation. That was never the prosecution case below and the Judge did not make any finding to that effect either.
These points are not open to the prosecution on appeal.
我不知後續會怎樣發展下去, 因為律政司說會研究判詞再決定會否上訴。以我有限知識以純法律看, 似乎沒有理據, 若不是從法律觀點看, 我就不會懂了。如果這上訴是本案最終結果, 黎智英另一宗案件20年的刑期會產生變化, 因為其中兩年應與本案同期執行的, 這同期的兩年消失了, 他20年的刑期就要由顛覆政權案不准保釋還押的時間扣減, 按《刑事訴訟條例》第67A"監禁刑罰的計算" (Computation of sentences of imprisonment)再計過。
