寃也不寃的獄

【明報專訊】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英涉與前行政總監黃偉強違反租契，向科技園公司隱瞞力高顧問租用將軍澳工業邨處所，兩人於2022年被裁定欺詐罪成，黎判囚5年9個月及罰款200萬元，黃判囚1年9個月，其後提出定罪上訴；上訴庭上月底裁定兩人上訴得直，撤銷刑罰。政府發言人回覆本報查詢時說，經綜合考慮所有相關因素後，律政司不會就本案採取進一步的法律行動。

我用明報這一段作引子, 來討論有讀者留言問究竟黃偉強白受牢獄之災可否獲得賠償。主菜未出先來幾小碟餐前醒胃菜。政府對肥佬黎恨之刺骨, 不會放過任何機會把他置之死地, 所謂"不會就本案採取進一步的法律行動", 講來講去根本是沒有上訴理據, 若然有一個微弱不堪的理據, 都會發揚光大上訴到底的。而且, 政府長篇大論的解釋, 說到好像放了肥佬黎這個公器私用的大壞蛋一馬的, 大家心照也心笑, 擺到明不應刑事檢控, 嚴格講不能叫公器私用, 這詞用濫了。不過, 講夠了, 否則吃完appertizers就埋單, 主菜都忘記吃。

為免無謂爭抝, 先不把黃偉強上訴得直的情況視作寃獄, 而是講一般情況。被告坐牢後最終被判無罪, 有兩種途經可申請賠償的。法例上其實並沒有為此直接明確訂定寃獄賠償的條文, 可依賴的法律條文只有香港人權法第11(5)條。條文中英文版如下:

經終局判決判定犯罪，如後因提出新證據或因發見新證據，確實證明原判錯誤而經撤銷原判或免刑者，除經證明有關證據之未能及時披露，應由其本人全部或局部負責者外，因此判決而服刑之人應依法受損害賠償。

When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.

除此之外, 就只有行政上的恩恤賠償(ex gratia payment)。

看人權法11(5)的條文, 也看到據此法例申請的關卡門檻要求嚴格, 既要是新證據的出現, 又要該證據沒被披露, 黃偉強的脫罪並不符合人權法例賠償的要求, 就算民事入稟追討也無勝算, 律政司一定反對, 律政司一定會說脫罪是技術性(technicality)擊倒。他極其量只獲脫罪的訟費。至於肥佬黎反正都在另一案被收押, 沒有寃獄可言。 連另一案20年的刑期也不上訴, 也無風雨也無晴, 也可能另有密秘安排。

黃偉強可以申請ex gratia payment的, 想獲批就等發夢, 從多啦A夢的八寶袋變魔術才行(律政司長鍾情這卡通, 我乘機投其所好奉承一下, 以盼推勉, 不用每天於闃無人影處, 聞卷帙飄香, 小師妹笑我得罪人多無得撈)。黃偉強這一年零九個月一定是白坐的。正所謂一人得道, 雞犬升天, 相反而言, 城門失火, 殃及池魚, 在肥佬黎池中的一眾minnows, 多少條走得甩?

留言者問這種賠償有沒有先例, 我相信一定有的, 但在協商下進行的賠償有保密協議, 政府不公開資料, 公眾沒渠道得知。公開看到的只有興訟的寥寥可數的法庭判詞, 沒有一宗成功案例。在搜尋案例時再遇這一宗: 香港特別行政區 訴 陳樹雄。這一宗引發我兩個司法界的朋友被照肺, 其中一個照到黐肺, 我是看到法庭新聞才知某官大人忽略了這上訴案例, 我立即告知也為時已晚, 吃救肺散也救不到。張達明義助(pro bono)上述案件的被告上訴, 期間要求班太判ex gratia payment給被告, 我不知張達明當時腦子是否進水, 竟然要求法官越俎代庖介入行政決定, 恩恤賠償被還押入小欖幾天的被告。這案例所講的只屬obiter, 無參考價值。聊以自慰的是從另一角度看, 少坐了的寃獄算撿了便宜, 沒坐爛了八月十五, 還有機會跟老伴春波碧草, 曉寒深處, 相對浴紅衣。

不論是Cervantes筆下的Don Quixote或魯迅筆下的阿Q, one has to pay for the chivalric acts。摸小尼姑的頭的阿Q, 也被人擲磚放狗。

I PG

有人問我為甚麼要repost上一個blog, 全因為部份留言涉及一些往事及私隱。重提前塵往事, 讓我重新思考當年自己在庭上是否太跋扈, 是否得處不饒人, 是否如其中一留言講我是壯年惡霸, 愛打爛仔架。要多謝那位師妹指責我當年欺負她, 師妹其實不是我師妹, 是對她愛護有加的一位退休多年的PM的師妹。在2011年, 我曾經嚴厲批評過那位PM法律犯錯, 在本博登了5篇文, 這PM如今也垂垂老矣, 法律犯錯是歷史事實, 但刊登博文是我的權利, 收回也是我的權利, 廢佬標少敬老是理所當然的, 所以我刪除了該系列的文章。

至於這師妹是何許人也, 我全無印象, 但小綿羊初出道遇上猛虎, 比遇苛政更慘, 遇苛政尚可歪打正着入桃花源以避秦, 在庭上是逃不了的。我自己想洗白, 說猛虎不吃小綿羊, 勝之不武, 也不光彩。但小師妹為了一單"傷人19"的審訊記恨34年, 刻骨蝕心傷足34年, 不管她是否太脆弱, 是否還在香港處理刑事案, 我反躬自省, 責任一定屬於我的。時光不能倒流, 歷史不能抹掉。為了撫平她的傷痕和情緒, 我充滿歉疚的負荊請罪, 幡然悔悟。我是在法庭上甚麼都不concede的人, 人老了, 嚴以律己, 寬以待人。況且, 小師妹說當年連金牙大狀清洪也對她說我是很麻煩的, 這是不容否認的事實, 因為清洪兜口兜面也這樣對我講我麻煩, 我對他是針鋒相對, 寸土不讓的。雖然搜索枯腸也記不起這事, 撇撇脫脫接納小師妹的講法, beyond all reasonable doubts, 我欺負她。

如果打爛仔架, 就莫過於對已故的瘋狗M Parker, 他根本是hyena/wild dog, 如果對佢斯文, 佢逼到你跌落街, 不是逼你埋牆角, 所以我見到他就一定留難。有一次在plea court, 幾十單案, 十個八個私人老狀, 其中一個是這瘋狗, 他代表個雙花紅棍, 控罪是傷人17, 警察給他擔保上庭, 瘋狗問我擔保條件, 即是一星期報到多少次的, 我卻二話不說反對保釋。嘩! 瘋狗狂吠到炸了鍋, 個官問我點解反對, 我隨口都講到一堆理由, 終於收押了被告。後來被告上高院申請保釋, 我老細一個SACP問我同一個問題, 我又隨口噏幾個理由, 佢最終攞到擔保, 三十幾年前, 十幾萬擔保, 我睇你以後邊個仲敢請瘋狗做律師, 除非你好想花多啲律師費。之後瘋狗上庭見到我就不敢太放肆了。打爛仔架也有打爛仔架的好處。有一次Warwick Reid貪污案同案的A律師見到我同我講: 我同個客講, 呢個主控好難搞, 你唔認就死梗, 一係就申請押後避咗佢, 不過佢會反對押後, 所以被告PG (plead guilty)。很多其他煩瑣事不能盡錄。講到底我惡行昭彰, 不管這小師妹是何許人, 我PG, 希望她像破地獄的儀式之後, 可以消除這傷痛, 放下前塵往事, 接受我道歉。

還有爛仔來挑機我還會打架嗎? Let's see. I have the upper hand.

一姐吃悶棍 (repost)

原本這一篇的留言涉及太多私隱, 所以把所有留言刪掉重登博文。如煙往事使人唏噓, 就讓它在混混沌沌間溜走。

黎智英的欺詐案昨天上訴庭頒令上訴得直, 原因有兩點, 簡而言之, 其一, 他沒有披露違反租約的責任, 所以不構成欺詐; 其二, 證據不足以使他個人負上刑責。本案的審訊及上訴均由刑事檢控專員楊美琪(Maggie Yang)親自披甲上陣。楊專員2021年8月正式坐正, 我印象中她以專員身分擔大旗作主控官的只有此宗, 她親自上陣的其他案件都涉及47人案被告在高院申請保釋的。為甚麼她選這一宗來做主控, 只有她自己才知道。這一宗一般會被視作違反租約的民事性質的案件, 以刑事檢控來處理並非標少的智力能理解的。上訴判詞不短, 我只是走馬式速讀, 要分析就留給學者去做。

本案對楊專員的威信打擊不少, 不是勝敗的關係。我以前講過, 歷屆的DPP披甲上陣最多的是薛偉成(Zervos), 他十分勇猛和辛辣, 轉任高院後現已是上訴庭法官。楊專員是事務律師出身, 一直在刑事檢控科辦事, 上庭經驗也豐富, 能力怎樣我沒資格評論, 我只是見過她初入職的模樣, 差不多時期入職的李運騰(Alex Lee)可能因為擁有短暫紀律部隊背景, 所以我覺得他思路清晰, 但這都是以前的印象, 後來就只能從判詞判斷個人能力。

這次黎智英上訴的判詞看到甚麼, 看倌當然要自己看。但我引用幾段來拋磚引玉, 以滿足在此出沒咪咪叫的小貓狺狺吠的小狗的食慾。判詞第118至123段足以使專員兩晚睡不着。第一點是專員沒有依賴《刑事訴訟程序條例》第101E條，即使該條文為最顯而易見的檢控途徑, 而依賴普通法的原則, 但本末倒置。第二點是在上訴時, 楊專員不能提出新理據爭辯。

G2.  Sub-issue 2: How was Apple Daily Printing’s duty attributable to each of the applicants?

118.  In case we were wrong on sub-issue 1, we proceed to deal with the second sub-issue on attribution.

119.  On the available evidence, the obvious route to attribute Apple Daily Printing’s breach of duty of disclosure to the applicants is section 101E of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221), which provides:

“Where a person by whom an offence under any Ordinance has been committed is a company and it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of a director or other officer concerned in the management of the company, or any person purporting to act as such director or officer, the director or other officer shall be guilty of the like offence.”

However, the prosecution had not invoked it at trial. When we at the hearing query why the prosecution did not do so, Ms Yang does not offer any explanation. Instead, she expressly states that she will not rely on the section either. In light of her position, any further consideration as to whether and how the section might have augmented the prosecution case is academic.

120.  Ms Yang seeks to rely on the established principle that corporate bodies are deemed to act and acquire knowledge through those individuals who can be identified as its directing minds: Smith, Hogan & Ormerod’s Criminal Law, 17^th Edition, §§8.1.2, 23.2; R v A Ltd & Others [2017] 1 Cr App R 1, at §§26-27; R v Alstom Network UK Ltd [2019] 2 Cr App R 34, at §30. Under this principle, the company is fixed with criminal liability through the acts or omissions of its directing mind. As the learned editors of Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (2025) summarized at §A6.23:

“Because a company is a separate person from its officers, the officers will not necessarily be guilty of a crime just because the company is. Conversely, since a company may be fixed with criminal liability through the acts or omissions of its ‘directing mind’, the way for criminal liability to be proved may, depending on the relevant rule of attribution, be by identifying the criminal acts of one of its officers; in those circumstances both the individual officer and the company may be guilty. In appropriate circumstances, both the company and its officers may be charged with a criminal offence and/or with aiding and abetting an employee to commit a crime …”

121.  This rule is the criminal law’s solution to the lack of a corporate body to perform the actus reus and a corporate mind capable of forming mens rea by treating the minds and bodies of the officers concerned as supplying its mental and physical faculties: Smith, Hogan & Ormerod’s Criminal Law, §8.1.2.5. It only attributes criminal liability to a company through the act of its officer who is the directing mind. It does not have the opposite effect of attributing the company’s criminal liability to its officers. Ms Yang’s reliance on this rule is entirely misplaced. If her submission were accepted, it would turn the rule on its head.

G3.  Sub-issue 3: Did the applicants have an independent personal duty?

122.  Ms Yang makes no submission that the applicants owed the Corporation an independent personal duty to disclose Apple Daily Printing’s breach of the user restrictions or the non-alienation clauses. That is a recognition on her part that no such duty arose either as a matter of law or on the facts.

G4.  Other points

123.  In her oral submissions, Ms Yang raises two fresh points for the first time on appeal:

(1)  Both Apple Daily Printing and the applicants might be held liable under the Charges as participants to a joint enterprise. However, that is not what the Charges alleged. Further, Apple Daily Printing has not been named as a co-defendant, contrary to the rudimentary requirement that the prosecution must expressly name a co-defendant in a joint charge if his identity is known.

(2)  The 1^st applicant had used Apple Daily Printing as a vehicle to perpetrate the fraud against the Corporation. That was never the prosecution case below and the Judge did not make any finding to that effect either.

These points are not open to the prosecution on appeal.

我不知後續會怎樣發展下去, 因為律政司說會研究判詞再決定會否上訴。以我有限知識以純法律看, 似乎沒有理據, 若不是從法律觀點看, 我就不會懂了。

如果這上訴是本案最終結果, 黎智英另一宗案件20年的刑期會產生變化, 因為其中兩年應與本案同期執行的, 這同期的兩年消失了, 他20年的刑期就要由顛覆政權案不准保釋還押的時間扣減, 按《刑事訴訟條例》第67A"監禁刑罰的計算" (Computation of sentences of imprisonment)再計過。